When Pressing Suits, Judges Tell Jurors Neither Social Nor Media is OK

A few months ago, Legal Bytes reported some important developments and judicial rulings concerning social media and freedom of the press in the United States (see, Freedom of the Press = Freedom to Tweet). But lest you be lulled into a false sense of security, freedom of the press only applies to the ‘press’ and not to jurors.

You have all seen the motion picture and television courtroom scenes played out numerous times. Evidence is admitted or not admissible. The jury is admonished to disregard certain remarks or testimony as inadmissible or irrelevant. Jurors are told they must reach a verdict on only the evidence that is allowable during the trial - nothing else. Now decades ago, a jury was told not to watch accounts of a case on television, or to listen to such on the radio, or to read newspaper articles about the case. Juries could be sequestered - squirreled away out of sight and, theoretically, out of harmful evidence’s way - until the verdict was rendered and justice done.

But today, with a mobile phone, PDA or any one of literally hundreds of devices – some no larger than a credit card – one can ‘tweet’ (www.Twitter.com), one can post to your or someone else’s wall (www.Facebook.com), one can upload photos (www.flickr.com) or videos (www.YouTube.com) or post to one’s own blog (www.LegalBytes.com). All from the convenience of the palm of your hand, purse or jacket pocket. One can also surf, search, ask and obtain answers across the web, almost instantaneously, with the press of a few buttons or the wave of one’s fingers across a touch screen. The interactive two-way communication and searches for independent information is at odds with our jury system that limits the juror’s knowledge base for decision-making purposes to what’s in her or his head when they walk in along with the evidence that is presented and deemed admissible by the court. Everything else is off limits – at least for administering justice. Although not the subject of this two-part blog posting, Legal Bytes has also covered the growing issue of whether a mindless application of disqualification criteria makes sense simply because you have a ‘friend’ or someone is ‘following’ you among the other thousands or millions of individuals on some social media platform (See, Florida Judges Can't Have Friends).

But now back to our story. Just this past December, the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management issued its “Proposed Model Jury Instructions - The Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on or Communicate about a Case”. I know this will surprise you, but the basic do’s and don’ts they proposed are:

  • Thou shalt not undertake any independent research, use any outside reference works, dictionaries, surf the web, or use any digital or other means to try and get information about the case or anything related to the case.
  • Thou shalt not communicate with anyone about the case – anyone - not even other jurors. No mobile phones, email, Blackberry, iPhone, SMS text messaging, tweets, blogging, chat rooms or social media platforms. None, nada, zilch, zero, null, never. Period.
  • Thou shalt decide the case solely on the admissible evidence presented in the courtroom.

Sound familiar? While many of us recognize there are sophisticated rules and regulations established to ensure evidence is presented in a fair manner, consistent with the system of justice - protecting the rights of the accused and the accuser, the plaintiff and the defendant - jurors often are curious – curious about questions that aren’t asked or answered during the course of a trial. In motion pictures or television, we get to go behind the scenes. We can often see what the jury cannot. But real juries may not appreciate, under the constraints of a particular case, why some information is simply not available to them, some questions not permissible, some witnesses never called and some answers never provided. It’s far too tempting to try and find out and with today’s digital technology – well, it’s not that hard to do so – sometimes even believing one can escape detection when doing so.

So stay tuned. In the next installment of this post, Legal Bytes will take you on a brief tour of some court decisions over the last few years, starting from simple emails and online surfing by jurors, to jurors who post blogs in the middle of jury deliberations, to tweets before, during and after multimillion dollar civil trials. Yes, we even have jurors communicating to each other on Facebook during a trial. You just can’t make this up.

While the next installment is pending, if you need to know more – how social media can help or hurt your company in litigation – remember that Reed Smith has teams of litigators who not only know digital (e-)discovery, forensic evidence, security and other technology applicable to legal proceedings, but also know social media – increasingly relevant, for good or bad, in dispute proceedings. Need us to press your suit and avoid being taken to the cleaners? Contact me, Joseph I. Rosenbaum or any Reed Smith attorney with whom you regularly work and stay tuned for Part II – Jurors Behave, or We’ll Throw the Facebook at You!

Social Media in Action in Litigation, Evidence & Privilege

Chapter Authors

United States:

Alexander “Sandy” Y. Thomas, Partner – athomas@reedsmith.com
Maureen C. Cain, Associate – mcain@reedsmith.com

United Kingdom:

Emma Lenthall, Partner – elenthall@reedsmith.com
Louise Berg, Associate – lberg@reedsmith.com


Introduction

This chapter looks at the relationship between social media and litigation practices.

Millions of employers, employees, and jurors use social media such as LinkedIn, company websites, Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and YouTube for business and personal reasons. Users of social media are often very candid and tend to post messages and photos with little thought, in an informal, spur-of-the-moment manner, from smart phones, BlackBerrys, and personal computers. Social media postings often include details that the user would never disclose directly in a formal correspondence, and certainly not to the boss of their company or to an opposing attorney if litigation were involved. Moreover, many people using social media do not realise that such postings often become a permanent record, even if the items are removed.[1]

Lawyers have begun researching social networking sites to gain information about all aspects of a case, including the parties on the other side, how a particular business is conducted, the witnesses, and the jurors. Social media sites contain valuable information such as messages, status updates, photos, and times of every posting, all of which can be used to undermine an opponent’s case in litigation, and which can even negatively affect a company’s business and public image.

This chapter describes various real-life examples of how social media has been used to undermine an opponent’s case in litigation and to negatively affect the image and business of various individuals or entities. Specifically, this chapter discusses how social media has been used to impeach witnesses, uncover documents that would ordinarily be protected by the work-product or attorney-client privilege, expose juror misconduct, and serve legal documents. As an employer, it is important to understand and educate all employees and in-house counsel on the risks associated with social media, how it can undermine the company’s legal positions, and its ultimate effect on business operations and public relations. (See Chapter 6 – Employment)

Social Media in Action in Litigation

The Use of Social Media To Impeach Witnesses

Social media sites may contain contradictory statements, character evidence, or other evidence that can be used to impeach witnesses during litigation. Below are a few illustrations:

  • In July 2008, Trisha Walsh Smith made a YouTube video regarding her bitter divorce from Broadway mogul Phillip Smith. In the video, Ms. Smith complained about the terms of her prenuptial agreement and made embarrassing sexually based remarks about her then-husband. After reviewing the post, the judge presiding over the case refused to change the terms of the prenuptial agreement and granted the husband a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhumane treatment.[2]
  • In People v. Liceaga, 2009 WL 186229 (Mich. App. 2009), the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after shooting a friend in the head. The defendant admitted to shooting his friend, but claimed it was an accident. The principal issue at trial was the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the shooting. Pursuant to Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) involving prior act evidence, the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce a picture of the defendant from his MySpace.com website that depicted him holding the gun that was used to shoot his friend, and displaying a gang sign with his hands. After the defendant was convicted, he appealed, arguing that the MySpace photograph was inadmissible. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling, stating that three witnesses used the photo to identify the defendant as the person who previously threatened them with the gun used in the case, and it was relevant for showing the defendant’s familiarity with the weapon used in the offense.
  • Shortly after severely injuring a young woman while driving under the influence, Joshua Lipton posted a photo of himself on Facebook jokingly wearing an orange prison jumpsuit during a Halloween party. The Rhode Island assistant attorney general displayed the photo in court as part of a PowerPoint presentation with the title “Remorseful?” over the photo. The judge presiding over the case focused in part on the photo when deciding to sentence Lipton to two years in state prison for his DUI.[3]
  • In Mai-Trang Thi Nguyen v. Starbucks Coffee Corp., 2009 WL 4730899 (N.D. Cal. 2009), a Starbucks employee was fired for inappropriate conduct and threatening violence to fellow employees. The employee then sued Starbucks for, inter alia, sexual harassment, religious discrimination, and retaliation. The employee’s MySpace page was submitted as evidence by Starbucks, where plaintiff stated: “Starbucks is in deep s**t with GOD!!! …I will now have 2 to turn 2 my revenge side (GOD’S REVENGE SIDE) 2 teach da world a lesson about stepping on GOD. I thank GOD 4 pot 2 calm down my frustrations and worries or else I will go beserk and shoot everyone….” Based on the evidence submitted by Starbucks, the court granted summary judgment in its favor.

As the above examples illustrate, users of social media often fail to consider the consequences of their posted statements and photos prior to such postings. In the corporate world, analogous postings could be made by employees regarding a wide range of work-related issues, including comments concerning layoffs that implicate the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, disclosures of intellectual property and trade secrets in various career-oriented chat rooms or blogs, and gossip about a sexual harassment or white collar crime internal investigation. It is imperative that a company’s managers, supervisors, and employees are educated on the implications and discoverability of such postings so that their use of social media does not undermine legal positions in a future or pending lawsuit against the company. (See Chapter 6 – Employment)

The Waiver of the Work-Product Doctrine and Attorney-Client Privilege Through Social Media

The use of company websites and other social media also provide real opportunity for waiver of the work-product doctrine protection and attorney-client privilege through public disclosure of confidential information. Below are a few examples:

  • In Kintera, Inc. v. Convio, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Cal. 2003), Kintera sued its competitor Convio for copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets after Convio allegedly obtained a CD Rom belonging to Kintera containing proprietary and confidential computer program codes relevant to both companies’ Internet-based marketing and fundraising services. For commercial reasons, Kintera discussed the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets on its company website, and noted that it had obtained signed affidavits under penalty of perjury from Convio employees. During discovery, Kintera tried to withhold the affidavits from Convio pursuant to the work-product doctrine but, based on the disclosures of the affidavits on Kintera’s website, the court rejected Kintera’s objections and ordered that Kintera produce the witness statements contained in the affidavits.
  • In Stern v. O’Quinn, 253 F.R.D. 663 (S.D. Fla. 2008), Howard K. Stern, the attorney and companion of Anna Nicole Smith, filed a defamation action against John M. O’Quinn & Associates after the firm allegedly made defamatory statements about Mr. Stern to the media while representing Ms. Smith’s mother, Virgie Arthur. Around the same time, a book was published entitled Blond Ambition: The Untold Story Behind Anna Nicole Smith’s Death, which accused Mr. Stern of numerous criminal acts. An investigator for the book, Wilma Vicedomine, discussed the results of her investigation with the author and also made numerous statements in on-line chat rooms regarding her investigative progress, including strategy, efforts to have Mr. Stern prosecuted, and conversations she had with Ms. Arthur. During discovery, plaintiff sought documents from the O’Quinn law firm that supported the statements made by the firm to the media. Furthermore, the discovery requests sought to determine the firm’s efforts in investigating whether the statements it made about plaintiff were true or false, including the statements made by Ms. Vicedomine for the Blond Ambition book. The firm tried to argue that the investigation for the book was protected by the work-product doctrine, but the court rejected such an argument because, inter alia, the contents of the investigation were published in chat rooms and to the author of the book. Accordingly, the court required the production of all postings in the chat rooms and all documents and statements provided to the author of the book.

As the above examples demonstrate, users of social media must be careful when disclosing personal or business information on-line in order to ultimately protect themselves from waiving the work-product doctrine or attorney-client privilege (or the foreign equivalents) in future or pending litigation. It is often sound business strategy for a company to post statements on its website to keep the public informed on various issues, and to ensure public confidence in the company’s product and services, bolster public relations, and increase profitability. However, if a company discloses too much, there are instances where it will risk waiving work-product and attorney-client communication protections. Managers, supervisors, or employees who disclose work-related issues in chat rooms and blogs run the risk of waiving both privileges as well, forcing a company to produce documents they ordinarily would have every right to withhold in litigation. Thus, it is essential that all managers, supervisors, and employees understand the implications of discussing work-related issues on-line, and to realise that certain postings will come back to haunt the employees and the company for which they work.

Social Media Use by Jurors

Social media can have a particularly pernicious effect on jury trials. In several recent instances, jurors have made inappropriate disclosures concerning corporate and individual litigants during the pendency of a trial. Businesses should police social media postings while a trial is ongoing to protect themselves from the consequences of such postings. Below are a few examples where such postings have been made:

  • In March 2009, Stoam Holdings, a building products company being sued for allegedly defrauding two investors, asked an Arkansas court to overturn a $12.6 million judgment, claiming that a juror used Twitter to send updates during the civil trial. The juror, Jonathan Powell, sent Twitter messages including, “oh and nobody buy Stoam. Its bad mojo and they’ll probably cease to Exist, now that their wallet is 12m lighter” and “So Jonathan, what did you do today? Oh nothing really, I just gave away TWELVE MILLION DOLLARS of somebody else’s money.” The trial court denied the motion seeking to overturn the verdict and the attorneys are currently appealing.[4]
  • In August 2009, two jurors in a murder trial had posted Facebook comments critical of jury duty and the length of trial. One Facebook Friend responded by stating, “Fry him.” A second responded that the juror should “Just vote guilty and get it over with.”[5]
  • In March 2009, defense attorneys in a federal corruption trial of a former Pennsylvania state senator, Vince Fumo, demanded before the verdict that the judge declare a mistrial because a juror posted updates on the case on Twitter and Facebook. The juror even told his readers that a “big announcement” was coming on Monday, prior to the verdict. Judge Buckwalter decided to let the deliberations continue, and the jury found Fumo guilty of all 137 counts charged in the indictment. His lawyers plan to use the Internet posting as grounds for appeal.[6]
  • In December 2009, Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon was convicted by a jury of embezzlement for stealing gift cards intended for the less fortunate. After the verdict, her lawyers initially asked for a new trial in part because five of the jurors were communicating among themselves on Facebook during the deliberation period, and at least one of them received an outsider’s online opinion regarding how the jury should decide the case.
  • In an English case in November 2008, three men were on trial for child abduction and sexual assault. One juror posted details of the trial on Facebook and created a poll, stating that she did not know “which way to go.” No privacy settings were activated so the posts could be read by all other Facebook members. The juror was subsequently dismissed from the jury.

As the above examples indicate, the use of social media by jurors during a trial may impact a company’s public image, business, and stock price if a juror leaks information about his or her perception of the case prior to the final verdict being rendered by all jurors. The use of social media by a juror may be grounds for a mistrial or an appeal because the social media postings of the juror may indicate that the juror was biased and was making a decision prior to reviewing and considering all evidence. Retrying a case and/or taking an appeal are both time-consuming and costly for companies. To prevent the above injuries to a company, it is essential that explicit instructions are given to the jury prior to the commencement of trial prohibiting the use of social media. Furthermore, it is wise for companies and their legal teams to research the social media sites during the trial to ensure that no juror is leaking the jurors’ thought processes about the case to the public and/or being tainted by other individual’s responses to any postings on the social media sites.

The Impact of Social Media on Methods of Service

Recent cases have also demonstrated that social media is forcing lawyers to consider more modern, and in some cases more appropriate, methods of service.

In October 2009, the English High Courts permitted service of an injunction via Twitter. In this case, which has become known as the ‘Blaney’s Blarney’ case, an anonymous Twitter user created a profile impersonating a right-wing political commentator and solicitor, Donal Blaney. The profile posted photographs and linked to Mr Blaney’s blog. Mr Blaney applied to the courts for injunctive relief against the unknown user.

The English Civil Procedure Rules allow service by several traditional methods, but also allow a claimant to request alternative service by less conventional means. The claimant must show that there is a good reason for doing so. In this case, it was permitted on the basis that the defendant was anonymous and could not be contacted.

The English courts were shown the way by the Australian courts in 2006, when service of a default judgment was permitted via Facebook (MKM Capital v. Corbo and Poyser, 2008, unreported). The claimant demonstrated that all alternatives had been exhausted, as the defendants were entirely uncooperative and, although not anonymous, had provided no address. The judge also required the claimant to show that it could reasonably be assumed that the Facebook accounts were set up and maintained by the defendants – the claimant did so by matching email addresses and dates of birth, as well as showing that the defendants were ‘friends’. A similar case occurred in New Zealand in March 2009.

As social media provides increasing scope for defamation and copyright infringement, more claimants likely will opt for service via these websites to overcome the obstacle of identifying the defendant. The flaw, however, in allowing such alternative methods of service may be in enforcement. In the Blaney’s Blarney case, the user complied and removed the profile. Otherwise, Mr Blaney would have had to go to Twitter to obtain the user’s details, and as they are based in California, there could have been problems enforcing any order.

Bottom Line—What You Need to Do

What is said on social media sites can and will be used against you and the company for which you work in a court of law, in the court of public opinion, and ultimately in the business world. Accordingly, it is essential that all managers, supervisors, employees, and in-house counsel be educated on the pitfalls involved with social media so as to prevent such postings from undermining your company’s legal position, business relations, and public image.



[1]      See, “A Growing Trend: Social Media As Legal Evidence,” West Michigan Business, July 29, 2009, available at http://www.mlive.com/business/west-michigan/index.ssf/2009/07/a_growing_trend_social_media_a.html

[2]       See, Phillip K. Anthony and Christine Martin, “Social Media Go to Court,” The National Law Journal, Feb. 2, 2009; Brad Hamilton, “Inside the YouTube Divorce,” New York Post, April 20, 2008, at http://www.nypost.com/seven/04202008/news/nationalnews/inside_youtube_divorce_107240.htm

[3]      See, Andrea Panciera, “Facebook Photo Plays Role in DUI Accident Sentencing,” Providence J., May 27, 2008 at http://newsblog.projo.com/2008/05face-book-photo.html; Phillip K. Anthony and Christine Martin, “Social Media Go to Court,” The National Law Journal, Feb. 2, 2009; see also United States v. Villanueva, 2009 WL 455127 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s sentencing enhancements involving possession of firearm based on statements made in YouTube video and MySpace photos showing defendant with an AK-47 and loaded clip); Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. 2009) (affirming trial court’s evidentiary ruling admitting boastful statements made by defendant on MySpace regarding how society labels him as an outlaw and criminal).

[4]     See, John G. Browning, “Dangers of the Online Juror,” at http://www.yourhonor.com/IC-Online/IC_Summer09/OnlineDanger2.html

[5]      See, Tom Murse, “Roseboro Juror’s Facebook Postings Pose Problems,” Intelligencer Journal Lancaster New Era, Aug. 4, 2009, available at http://articles.lancasteronline.com/local/4/240616#

[6]     See, John Schwartz, “As Jurors Turn to Web Mistrials Are Popping Up,” The New York Times, March 17, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html

Isn't Technology Supposed to Help Us? Help Us Work Smarter?

If you have been reading Legal Bytes regularly, you know that Lois Thomson here at Reed Smith has been one of the primary people supporting my efforts to transform "legal-ese" into understandable English – no trivial task for those of you who are interacting or have ever interacted with lawyers. So it is with great joy that I was not only able to have her write a post for Legal Bytes, but that I also finally got to edit her article. Hopefully she will smile and agree it's been helpful. So, Lois, thank you, and here is your relevant and very timely note for all the world to see:

"I looked at an email I received from my friend, Robert, and wondered why the subject line was a reply regarding an issue of Legal Bytes that I had proofread for Joe Rosenbaum. 'Are you aware that you have been sending these to me?' Robert's message read. 'It seems like that might have been a mistake.'

"Ouch! A mistake indeed! You see, when Joe sends his documents to me to review, I proof them and make my suggested changes. I then simply hit the forward button to return them to him. Now as many of you email-program (e.g., Outlook) users already know, to make life easier (that's ostensibly what technology is supposed to do), once I start to type in "ro," Rosenbaum, Joseph I.'s name should automatically populate the 'To' field. Oops. Not this time. Instead, my friend Robert's name came up, and without looking – as I'm guessing so many of us routinely do – I hit enter and sent it off, pleased I had been so timely and responsive. Unfortunately, I was responding to my friend Robert, who may happily read Legal Bytes, but not, I suspect, the artist's proof!

"Fortunately, Joe and Robert were gracious about the whole thing and in this case, both felt no harm was done. But what if the message had been from your lawyer or doctor or a rabbi or priest, or was some other communication that was not ultimately meant for public consumption. It was a simple but powerful reminder to me (and one that Joe felt was important enough to ask me to pass it on to you), that while automated tools can make routine tasks like 'field completion' simpler, they can also lead to problems if we rely on them without thinking. Hmmmm, now why can't I remember phone numbers anymore – is it because they are all programmed into every device I own, so that I no longer have to think?"

A helpful reminder that while automated tools are great, they are just that – tools. If we aren't careful, the tools can work against us and not for us, and can create embarrassment at best, liability at worst. Thank you Lois (and Robert).

Need to know more? Contact me, Joseph I. Rosenbaum, or any Reed Smith attorney with whom you regularly work. Need proofreading skills? If you don't work for Reed Smith, don't call Lois. She's busy helping us every day. Thanks again, Lois.

Freedom of the Press = Freedom to Tweet

Twitter keeps hitting the newswires—in this instance, in a matter involving freedom of the press. You might have heard from time to time, especially in high-profile or emotionally charged cases, about judges who have used their power to control proceedings by restricting the use of certain communications equipment and mechanisms from within their courtrooms (e.g., use of mobile phones, video recording equipment, etc.).

From Pennsylvania comes an order from a Dauphin County judge refusing to bar reporters from sending Tweets during the course of a public and high-profile trial. In response to a motion by the defendants counsel, Judge Lewis, in a brief order, noted that ". . . to impose the proposed restriction would be premature and that the restriction itself is overly broad."

In this particular case, the defendants were concerned that reporters, using Twitter inside the courtroom, would broadcast witnesses testimony, which could then be read or seen by other witnesses who were yet to testify. While refusing to ban Twitter to reporters, the judge did order the witnesses to avoid reading or listening to reports concerning the trial.

As icing on the cake, our own Reed Smith lawyers, Tom McGough, Mark Tamburri and Tom Pohl, won the order on behalf of the Associated Press and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. Yes, Virginia, there is a place for social media in jurisprudence.

If you remember, Twitter was also the subject of some controversy in Pittsburgh during the G20 Summit last year. In that case, involving freedom of speech, police in Pittsburgh arrested a man who was using Twitter to send messages about the movements of police officers as protests were unfolding. Although the police sought to charge the man with aiding an illegal protest, the man was broadcasting what was easily visible in plain sight.

While commercial cases often involve money or intellectual property rights, or rights of publicity or privacy, cases are emerging that involve fundamental Constitutional rights. The law will need to move quickly into the digital and social media age in order to keep up. Some courts and judges are doing just that! 

Need to know more? Contact me, Joseph I. Rosenbaum, or any Reed Smith attorney with whom you regularly work.

Court Rules Twitter Libel is Stale, and Neither Ripe Nor Moldy

Back in July, Legal Bytes posted a report (Landlord Can't Let Tweet sMOLDer) about a Twitter "tweet" posted by Amanda Bonnen, that contained the following statement: "Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment was bad for you? Horizon realty thinks it's OK."

Back then we told you that Horizon Group Management, the landlord of the apartment building involved, filed suit in a Cook County Illinois Court for libel, alleging that it was a "malicious and defamatory" tweet about the state of her apartment. 

Well this past Wednesday (Jan. 20, 2010), Cook County Circuit Court Judge Diane J. Larsen dismissed the suit, and Ms. Bonnen's attorney indicated the judge described the posting as too vague to constitute libel under the legal tests applicable to such a claim.

To support a claim of libel, Horizon would have had to show that Ms. Bonnen wasn't merely offering her opinion, that the statement must be reasonably understood by everyone to refer to the specific entity—in this case, this particular Horizon realty company—and that there was actual harm that can be proved, flowing from the statement. The fact that the statement was made on Twitter, and consequently widely available across the Internet, doesn't change the standard one must meet to prove libel, and the judge dismissed the case. 

As you can guess, these aren't the only cases involving defamation in the context of social media. For example, the action against Courtney Love, wife of the late Kurt Cobain, is alive and well. You might recall that case arose when a fashion designer claimed Ms. Love tweeted that the designer was a drug addict, a prostitute and called her a "lying hosebag thief." As we reported in Legal Bytes this past August (Court Orders Google to Turn Over Blogger Identity Information), cases of defamation become even more complex when the identity of the actual "tweeter" is hidden behind a pseudonym.

These cases all hinge upon the friction created by social interaction. Defamation is not a new concept, and whether broadcast over radio waves or propagated across the web, it should come as no surprise that when human beings populate the borderless universe of cyberspace, these interactions can give rise to legal actions. The laws that apply to publicity, privacy, libel, deceptive advertising, unfair competition and intellectual property may need to be applied or viewed differently, but they don’t disappear simply because the content is digital. Need to know more? Contact me, Joseph I. Rosenbaum, or any Reed Smith attorney with whom you regularly work.

Florida Judges Can't Have Friends

Just last month, the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee in Florida issued an Opinion that Florida judges may not have social media "friends" if they are lawyers who may appear before them in court. While the average person may question what being a "friend" on any media platform really means in terms of the level or relationship outside the virtual world of web-based interaction – how many of you are "friends" with people you have never met and don't even know? – the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee indicated that their main issue is not fact, but perception.

The Committee expressed concern that the "friend" identifier could create the impression or the appearance in a publicly available forum, that the lawyer might be in a position to influence the judge.

Influence the judge? Hmmm. So, let's see. If I'm a government official or a corporate procurement officer, or perhaps I'm just campaigning for public office, I really can't befriend anyone on any social media platform or network – unless I'm prepared to face potential charges of bribery, accepting bribes, improperly influencing a public official, or being improperly influenced in procurement and purchasing decisions. Can you think of other situations in which acknowledging another individual as a "friend" on a social media platform or social networking site might be considered a violation of some code of conduct? Have you read your employer's code of conduct lately?

Not to worry, that's just the tip of the iceberg. Have you checked those "fan" pages recently? Are you a journalist? Celebrity endorser? Blogger? Check the revised FTC Endorsement Guides carefully. Perhaps you need to disclose your material connection when you became a fan! Oh, and you corporate employees and investment advisors (and journalists) better think twice before becoming a friend or a fan. After all, do you have to disclose to your clients or the Securities and Exchange Commission that you are a fan of "INSERT YOUR FAVORITE BRAND HERE"?

Now I don't want to worry anyone needlessly, so here's a tip for all of you Legal Bytes readers, whether you are a judge (are judges allowed to read Legal Bytes?), a lawyer or simply a normal person: If you wish to recuse yourself from a case, change the venue or forum for a trial, or simply avoid being picked for jury duty, I have a recommendation. Befriend the defendant, become a fan of the company, send a Facebook friend request to as many police officers (or, depending on your preference, inmates) as you can, and become a Twitter "follower" of as many products, services, public officials and political parties as you can.

Much to my regret, I have now been permanently removed from the White House guest list because I have become a fan of the Presidential Portuguese water dog "Bo" - the "First Dog." While it had never occurred to me that being thoroughly engaged by this adorable puppy would get me into trouble, the fact that the dog is "Portuguese" appears to have created the perception that there could be a conflict between my loyalties to our government and Portugal – although I confess to being partial to the food and the Algarve as an occasional vacation spot.

That said, I don't feel alone any more since, even though the pup is officially registered with the American Kennel Club as "Amigo's New Hope," I believe that the President and First Lady Obama, as well as their daughters Malia and Sasha, for whom Bo was an election day promise, are also under investigation for possible ethics violations in connection with their love for Bo. Strange, brave new world.

So keep your web browser tuned (or bookmarked) to www.LegalBytes.com for breaking news. The social media fun is just beginning, and if you haven't checked your company policy lately (or revised it), or if you need help making sense of social media and the legal implications, you've come to the right place. Feel free to contact me—Joe Rosenbaum—or any of the lawyers at Reed Smith you work with. We are happy to help.

Landlord Can't Let Tweet sMOLDer

If you have been wondering what happened to the third grade line “there’s a fungus among us,” we have the answer. It seems a “tweet” made available May 12, 2009 on Twitter contained the following statement: ". . . Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment was bad for you? Horizon realty thinks it's OK." Since the tweet is alleged to be available publicly for the world to see on Twitter, that didn’t seem particularly humorous to the management of the apartment building in which the Tweeter lives.

So non-humorous in fact, that Horizon Group Management, landlord of the apartment building in question, has filed suit in a Cook County Illinois Court for libel, alleging this was a "malicious and defamatory" tweet about the state of her apartment. The complaint further contends that because the "statement damaged the plaintiff's reputation in its business, the statement is libel per se." Horizon is seeking a minimum of $50,000 in damages and that isn’t birdseed. You can read a copy of the complaint right here.

Waive Your Right to Jury Trial--California Weighs In

A recent California Supreme Court decision (Grafton Partners v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers) held that the California Constitution prohibits pre-dispute waiver agreements when it comes to jury trials. In other words, jury trial waiver provisions in many commercial and consumer contracts may now be unenforceable in California. The decision indicates that a party may not be able to contractually waive its rights to a jury trial because the California Code of Civil Procedure limited enforceability of jury waiver agreements to only those agreements that were entered into after the filing of a lawsuit, not in advance. This is likely to be appealed. We will keep you posted.